On a public sidewalk in Portland, Maine, Polyxenia Pantos is photographing an immigration arrest. Days later, according to court filings, her spouse’s home address, phone number, and list of cohabitants were in a federal investigative database. This type of surveillance app-style targeting of civilians has also appeared in other government operations.
Partially unsealed filings in an active federal class action reveal the alleged mechanics: a system built for serious criminal investigations, reportedly used to catalog people who are simply watching.
What the registration says has happened
Court documents describe a pattern of data collection that targets observers, not suspects.
The case originates Operation Catch of the Day, an immigration enforcement raid in Maine in January 2026. An agent identified in filings as “JC” allegedly created Investigative Case Management (ICM) records for at least six observers; Government deposits put the number at eight.
According to court documents, the information allegedly collected included:
- Photographs by observers
- License plate numbers
- Home addresses and phone numbers
- Names of household members
- Labels like “Threat to Law Enforcement, Professional Protests”
The filing alleges that after Pantos photographed an arrest near a vehicle registered to her spouse, Carlyn Williams, JC ran the license plate. They runa LexisNexis law enforcement database, and pulled a report listing Williams’ address, phone numbers and cohabitants. He then circulated Williams’ photo to colleagues before entering both individuals into the ICM.
Williams says JC later called her and warned her that further observation would lead to a domestic terrorism watch list. JC denied using that specific language in the deposition, but, according to the filing, said Williams could be arrested if she continued. No plaintiff has been nominated to the terrorist watch list, the government says.
Protect Democracy attorney JoAnna Suriani said the plaintiffs believe the government has treated people exercising First Amendment rights as criminal suspects, as reported by WIRED.
The architecture that made this easy
The design of the system, not just the behavior of an agent, raises the hard questions.
ICM is Homeland Security Investigations’ case-management system, built Palantir’s Gotham Software. ICE awarded Palantir the original contract in 2014; a later support contract added approx $96 million; a 2025 price added almost $30 million for a product called “ImmigrationOS.” Palantir did not respond to requests for comment.
Here is where the design becomes consistent. According to one 2016 DHS Privacy AssessmentICM automatically shares subject records with TECS, CBP’s traveler screening system, where they can function as lookout records at the border.
Think of it like a Google Drive folder where “view access” quietly became “edit and share” because someone built sharing into the foundation. No one announces the scope change; the infrastructure just fits it.
A CBP officer allegedly called an application used Mobile request Perform facial recognition searches on photos provided by JC. That’s three systems, two agencies, and one sidewalk bystander, according to the filing. Parallel patterns of covert user tracking have emerged in other government-related technology deployments.
The position of the government
DHS disputes the lawsuit’s characterization, saying the alleged conduct violated its own policies.
DHS calls the case meritless and refuses to operate a domestic terrorism database targeting protesters. His motion to dismiss characterized the alleged conduct as isolated and contrary to DHS policy, arguing that JC created records for people he believed posed a security threat and did not nominate anyone for the terrorist watch list.
Former acting ICE Director Todd Lyons told Rep. Maxwell Frost that ICE does not maintain a database of US citizens protesting ICE activity. His letter also acknowledged that ICE can still collect information about people believed to be involved in potential federal law violations or to pose officer-safety concerns. That information becomes an official government record when collected, the letter said.
What needs to change
The constructive fix is purpose limitation, enforced by design rather than by policy alone.
The issue is not Palantir’s existence. It is purpose limitation: Surveillance systems intended for criminal cases need technical safeguards that prevent their use against people engaged in constitutionally protected surveillance.
Audit logs, role-based access controls, and mandatory supervisor review before an observer enters a case file are not radical demands. They are the type of governance controls that distinguish an investigative tool from a surveillance dragnet.
The ICM-to-TECS automatic sharing path deserves particular scrutiny. According to the 2016 DHS privacy assessment, a record created by an agent in a state can function as a border lookout record, a documented system capability that makes the Maine allegations newly relevant. This is not a theoretical risk; it’s how the system was designed to work.
The plaintiffs are asking the court to archive Williams’ recordings, prevent DHS from using collected information against them, and prohibit Maine agents from threatening observers with watch lists or following them home. The trial may ultimately determine whether the collection violated constitutional protections. It may also determine whether the automatic data exchange pipeline between examination and border control systems requires a policy correction. No resolution was reached; the case remains pending.